University of Minnesota - Twin Cities

 

 

Department of Economics                                                                                                          Placement Director

1035 Heller Hall                                                                                               Fabrizio Perri

271 - 19th Avenue South                                                                                  (612) 625-7504         or

Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455                                                                       (612) 204-5526        

U.S.A.                                                                                                                  fperri@umn.edu

Placement Coordinator

(612) 625-6353                                                                                                   Catherine Bach

(612) 624-0209 FAX                                                                                         (612) 625-6859

                                                                                                                            c-bach@umn.edu                                                                                              

 


Curriculum Vitae  Fall 2007


                   

                                                            FRANCESCA CARAPELLA

 

Personal Data

Home Address                                                           Telephone Numbers

401 South First Street, #821                                            Cell:        (612) 232-0288                   

Minneapolis, MN   55401                                               Office:     (612) 204-5521

E-mail:    cara0020@umn.edu

Citizenship: Italian (F-1 Visa)                                      URL:       carapellaf.googlepages.com/home

 

Major Fields of Concentration

 

Macroeconomics, Monetary Economics, Public Economics

 

Education

Degree                       Field                        Institution                                                       Year                                                

Ph.D.                          Economics               University of Minnesota (expected)                     2008

M.A.                          Economics               CORIPE Piemonte (Italy)                                   2002

Bachelor’s Degree      Economics                LUISS University (Italy)                                     2001

 

Dissertation

Title: “Banking Panics and deflation in Dynamic General Equilibrium r   "

Dissertation Advisor:    Professor V. V. Chari

Expected Completion:   Summer 2008

 

References

 

Professor V. V. Chari                          (612) 626-7151                              Department of Economics

(612) 204-5518                              University of Minnesota

chari@res.mpls.frb.fed.us              1035 Heller Hall

271 - 19th Avenue South

Professor Larry E. Jones                      (612) 624-4553                              Minneapolis, MN 55455

(612) 204-5519

lej@econ.umn.edu

 

Dr. Warren Weber                             (612) 204-5485                                 Research Department

wew@res.mpls.frb.fed.us                Federal Reserve Bank

   of Minneapolis

90 Hennepin Avenue

Minneapolis, MN   55480

 

 

 

Honors and Awards

 

Spring 2003   Marco Fanno fellowship from MCC (ITALY)

 

Teaching Experience

 

2002 - 2003       Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, LUISS, Rome, Italy.

   Led recitation sections for     Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics.

 

Research Experience

 

2006 - Present      Research Assistant, Research Department, Federal Research Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Research Assistant for Dr. Martin Schneider.

2005 - 2006           Research Analyst, Research Department, Federal Research Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

 

Publications

 

“A Model of Banknote Discounts,” (with Laurence Ales, Pricila Maziero, and Warren Weber),      Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.

“Deposit Insurance, Institutions, and Bank Interest Rates,” (with Giorgio Di Giorgio),    Transition Studies Review 11:3 (December 2004): 77-92.

 

Papers

 

“Banking Panics and deflation in Dynamic General Equilibrium”

 

Presentations

 

“Banking Panics and deflation in Dynamic General Equilibrium"     presented during  2007 at Midwest Theory Annual Meeting, Minneapolis, MN;  Midwest Macroeconomics Annual Meeting, Cleveland, OH; Annual Meeting of the Society for Economic Dynamics, Prague, Czech Republic; Money, Banking, Payments and Finance conference, Cleveland FED, OH.

 

“A Model of Banknote Discounts,  ”  presented in 2006 at Conference on Payment Methods II, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  

 

Computer Skills

 

Fortran, Matlab, Stata

 

Languages

 

Italian (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)

 

Dissertation Abstract

 

Essay 1:   “Banking Panics and deflation in Dynamic General Equilibrium” (job market paper)

Typically banking panics have been associated with deflation and declines in economic activity in the monetary history of the US and other countries. This paper develops a dynamic framework to study the interaction between banking and monetary policy. One result is the presence of multiple equilibria: banking panics and deflation arise at the same time and endogenously as equilibrium outcomes. Deposit contracts are written in nominal terms, so if prices fall relative to what was anticipated at the time the deposit contract was signed, then the real value of banks’ existing obligations increases. So banks default, a banking panic precipitates and economic activity declines. If banks default on their deposits the demand for cash in the economy increases, because financial intermediation provided by banks disappears. The price level drops thereby leading banks to default.  Friedman-Schwartz hypothesized that if the monetary authority had followed an alternative monetary policy during the early 1930s, aimed at keeping prices constant, it  would have prevented banks from failing and output from falling, thus reducing the extent of the cycle. In the context of this model the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis is correct.

In this framework a mechanism like deposit insurance, when coupled with strict regulatory arrangements, achieves the same goal as the monetary policy. Absent strict regulatory arrangements however, deposit insurance amplifies business cycle fluctuations by inducing moral hazard.

 

Essay 2: “A Model of Banknote Discounts” (joint with Laurence Ales, Pricila Maziero, and Warren Weber       )

 

Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes–dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally differed from the discounts quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A. Also, discounts generally increased when banks suspended payments on their notes. In this paper we construct a random matching model to qualitatively match these facts about banknote discounts. To attempt to account for locational differences, the model has agents that come from two distinct locations. Each location also has bankers that can issue notes. Banknotes are accepted in exchange because banks are required to produce when a banknote is presented for redemption and their past actions are public information. Overall, the model delivers predictions consistent with the behavior of discounts.